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[61] 
Applied Artificial Intelligence in Modern 
Warfare and National Security Policy 
BRIAN SEAMUS HANEY1 
Abstract 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications in modern warfare have 
revolutionized national security power dynamics between the United 
States, China, Russia, and the private industry. The United States has fallen 
behind in military technologies and is now at the mercy of big technology 
companies to maintain peace. After committing $150 billion toward the 
goal of becoming the AI technology world leader, China claimed success in 
2018. In 2019, Chinese researchers published open-source code for AI 
missile systems controlled by deep reinforcement learning algorithms. 
Further, Russia’s continued interference in United States’ elections has 
largely been driven by AI applications in cybersecurity. Yet, despite 
outspending Russia and China combined on defense, the United States is 
failing to keep pace with foreign adversaries in the AI arms race. 
Previous legal scholarship dismisses AI militarization as futuristic 
science-fiction, accepting without support the United States’ prominence as 
the world leader in military technology. This inter-disciplinary article 
provides three main contributions to legal scholarship. First, this is the first 
piece in legal scholarship to take an informatics-based approach toward 
analyzing the range of AI applications in modern warfare. Second, this is 
the first piece in legal scholarship to take an informatics-based approach in 
analyzing national security policy. Third, this is the first piece to explore 
the complex power and security dynamics between the United States, 
China, Russia, and private corporations in the AI arms race. Ultimately, a 
new era of advanced weaponry is developing, and the United States 
Government is sitting on the sidelines. 
 
 1.  J.D. Notre Dame Law School 2018, B.A. Washington & Jefferson College 2015. 
Special thanks to Richard Susskind, Margaret Cuonzo, Max Tegmark, Ethem Alpaydin, 
Sam Altman, Josh Achiam, Volodymyr Mnih & Angela Elias. 
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Introduction 
Cyberwarfare continues on a daily basis, with the United States under 
constant attack.2 Threats of nuclear missile strikes from adversaries appear 
in daily headlines.3 Today, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the United States’ 
most powerful weapon for defense.4 Yet, in AI development, the United 
States is falling behind adversaries like China and Russia.5 In 2017, China 
committed $150 billion toward becoming the world leader in AI, claiming 
success the next year.6 Interference in U.S. elections is largely being driven 
by substantial Russian investments in AI cybersecurity applications.7 All 
the while, the United States Government and Department of Defense 
remain at the mercy of big technology companies like Google and 
Microsoft to ensure advancements in AI research and development.8 
The Law of Accelerating Returns (“LOAR”) states that fundamental 
measures of information technology follow predictable and exponential 
trajectories.9 Indeed, information technologies build on themselves in an 
exponential manner.10 Applied to AI, the LOAR provides strong support 
 
 2.  James Kadtke & , John Wharton, Technology and National Security: The United 
States at a Critical Crossroads, DEFENSE HORIZONS 84, National Defense University 1 
(March 2018). 
 3.  Hyung-Jin Kim, North Korea Confirms Second 2nd Test of a Multiple Rocket 
Launcher, MILITARY TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/20 
19/09/11/north-korea-confirms-2nd-test-of-multiple-rocket-launcher/; see also https://time. 
com/5673813/north-korea-confirms-second-rocket-launcher-test/. See also Nasser Karimi 
&, John Gambrell, Iran Uuses Advanced Centrifuges, Threatens Higher Enrichment, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/7e896f8a1b0c40769b54ed4 
f98a0f5e6. 
 4.  Karl ManheimKarl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to 
Privacy and Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 108 (2019); see also User Clip: Elon 
Musk at the National Governors Association 2017 Summer Meeting, C-SPAN (July 15, 
2017) https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4676772/elon-musk-national-governors-association-
2017-summer-meeting & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and 
Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 108 (2019); see also User Clip: Elon Musk at the 
National Governors Association 2017 Summer Meeting, C-SPAN (July 15, 2017) https:// 
www.c-span.org/video/?c4676772/elon-musk-national-governors-association-2017-summer 
-meeting. 
 5.  Kadtke & Wharton, supra note 2, at 1. 
 6.  Gregory C. Allen, Understanding China’s AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese Strategic 
Thinking on Artificial Intelligence and National Security, Center for a New American 
Security 9 (2019).  
 7.  KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45178, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 24 (2019). 
 8.  Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Challenges, 
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 354 (2016). 
 9.  RAY KURZWEIL, HOW TO CREATE A MIND 250 (2012). 
 10.  Id. at 251-55. 
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for AI’s increasing role in protecting the national defense.11 Indeed, similar 
to the way in which aviation and nuclear weapons transformed the military 
landscape in the twentieth century, AI is reconstructing the fundamental 
nature of military technologies today.12 
Yet legal scholars continue to deny and ignore AI’s applications as a 
weapon of mass destruction. For example, in a recent MIT Starr Forum 
Report, the Honorable James E. Baker, former Chief Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, argues “we really won’t 
need to worry about the long-term existential risks.”13 And, University of 
Washington Law Professor, Ryan Calo argues, regulators should not be 
distracted by claims of an “AI Apocalypse” and to focus their efforts on 
“more immediate harms.”14 All the while, private corporations are pouring 
billions into AI research, development, and deployment.15 In a 2019 
interview, Paul M. Nakasone, The Director of the National Security 
Agency (NSA) stated, “I suspect that AI will play a future role in helping 
us discern vulnerabilities quicker and allow us to focus on options that will 
have a higher likelihood of success.”16 Yet, Elon Musk argues today, “[t]he 
biggest risk that we face as a civilization is artificial intelligence.”17 The 
variance in the position of industry leaders relating to AI and defense 
demonstrates a glaring disconnect and information gap between legal 
scholars, government leaders, and the private industry. 
The purpose of this Article is to aid in closing the information gap by 
explaining the applications of AI in modern warfare. Further, this article 
contributes the first informatics-based analysis of the national security 
policy landscape. This article proceeds in three parts: Part I explains the 
state-of-the-art in AI technology; Part II explores three national security 
threats resulting from AI applications in modern warfare; and Part III 
discusses national security policy relating to AI from international and 
domestic perspectives. 
 
 11.  NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 94 (2017). 
 12.  Honorable James E. Baker, Artificial Intelligence and National Security Law: A 
Dangerous Nonchalance, STARR FORUM REPORT 1 (2018). 
 13.  Id. at 5. 
 14.  Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 399, 431 (2017). 
 15.  Andrew Thompson, The Committee on Foreign Investment in The United States: 
An Analysis of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, 19 J. HIGH 
TECH. L. 361, 363 (2019). 
 16.  An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone, 92 JOINT FORCE Q. 1, 9 (2019). 
 17.  User Clip: Elon Musk at the National Governors Association 2017 Summer 
Meeting, C-SPAN (July 15, 2017) https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4676772/elon-musk-nat 
io nal-governors-association-2017-summer-meeting. 
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I. Artificial Intelligence 
Contemporary scholars have presented several different definitions of 
AI. For example, MIT Professor Max Tegmark concisely defines 
intelligence as the ability to achieve goals18 and AI as “non-biological 
intelligence.”19 Additionally, according to Stanford Professor Nils Nilsson 
AI is “concerned with intelligent behavior in artifacts.”20 A recent One 
Hundred Years Study defines AI as, “a science and a set of computational 
technologies that are inspired by—but typically operate quite differently 
from—the ways people use their nervous systems and bodies to sense, 
learn, reason, and take action.”21 For the purposes of this paper AI is any 
system replicating the thoughtful processes associated with human 
thought.22 Advancements in AI technologies continue at alarming rates.23 
This Part proceeds by discussing three types of AI systems commonly used 
in the context of national security: deep learning, reinforcement learning, 
and deep reinforcement learning. 
A. Deep Learning 
Deep learning is a process by which neural networks learn from large 
amounts of data.24 Defined, data is any recorded information about the 
world.25 In deep learning, the idea is to learn feature levels of increasing 
abstraction with minimum human contribution.26 The models inspiring 
current deep learning architectures have been around since the 1950s.27 
Indeed, the Perceptron, which serves as the basic tool of neural networks 
was proposed by Frank Rosenblatt in 1957.28 However, artificial 
intelligence research remained relatively unprosperous until the dawn of 
 
 18.  MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0 BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
50 (2017). 
 19.  Id. at 39. 
 20.  NILS J. NILSSON, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A NEW SYNTHESIS 1 (1998). 
 21.  Stan. U., Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030, One Hundred Year Study on 
Artificial Intelligence, 1 (2016). 
 22.  Brian S. Haney, The Perils and Promises of Artificial General Intelligence, 45 J. 
LEGIS. 151, 152 (2018). 
 23.  PAUL E. CERUZZI, COMPUTING A CONCISE HISTORY 114 (2012). 
 24.  Haney, supra note 22, at 157. 
 25.  ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 3 (2016). See also MICHAEL 
BUCKLAND, INFORMATION AND SOCIETY 21-22 (2017) (discussing definitions of 
information). 
 26.  JOHN D. KELLEHER, BRENDEN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 134 (2018). 
 27.  SEBASTIAN RASCHKA & VAHID MIRJALILI, PYTHON MACHINE LEARNING 18 (2017). 
 28.  Id. 
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the internet.29 Generally, deep learning systems are developed in four parts: 
data pre-processing, model design, training, and testing. 
Deep learning is all about the data.30 Every two days humans create 
more data than the total amount of data created from the dawn of humanity 
until 2003.31 Indeed, the internet is the driving force behind modern deep 
learning strategies because the internet has enabled humanity to organize 
and aggregate massive amounts of data.32 According to machine learning 
scholar, Ethem Alpaydin, it’s the data that drives the operation, not human 
programmers.33 The majority of the time spent with deep learning system 
development is during the pre-processing stage.34 During this initial phase, 
machine learning researchers gather, organize, and aggregate data to be 
analyzed by neural networks.35 
The types of data neural networks process vary.36 For example, in 
autonomous warfare systems, images stored as pixel values are associated 
with object classification for targeting.37 Another example is gaining 
political insight with a dataset of  publicly available personal data on 
foreign officials. How the data is organized largely depends on the goal of 
the deep learning system.38 If a system is being developed for predictive 
purposes the data may be labeled with positive and negative instances of an 
occurrence.39 Or, if the system is being learned to gain insight, the data may 
remain unstructured, allowing the model to complete the organization 
task.40 
A deep learning system’s model is the part of the system which 
analyzes the information.41 Most commonly the model is a neural 
network.42 Neural networks serve the function of associating information to 
 
 29.  PETER J. DENNING & MATTI TEDRE, COMPUTATIONAL THINKING 93 (2019). 
 30.  David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with The Data: What Legal Scholars Should 
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 668 (2017). 
 31.  RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 11 (2nd ed. 2017). 
 32.  ALPAYDIN, supra note 25, at 10-11. 
 33.  Id. at 12.  
 34.  KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 26, at 97.  
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 101. 
 37.  Symposium, A Framework Using Machine Vision and Deep Reinforcement 
Learning for Self-Learning Moving Objects in a Virtual Environment, AAAI 2017 Fall 
Symposium Series (2017), https://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/FSS/FSS17/paper/view/16003/ 
15319.pdf. 
 38.  Michael Simon, et al., Lola v. Skadden and the Automation of the Legal 
Profession, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH 254, 300 (2018). 
 39.  Tariq Rashid, MAKE YOUR OWN NEURAL NETWORK 13 (2018). 
 40.  Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 111. 
 41.  Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 26, at 121. 
 42.  Tegmark, supra note 18, at 76. 
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derive knowledge.43 Neural networks models are based on the biological 
neo-cortex.44 Indeed, the human brain is composed of processing units 
called neurons.45 Each neuron in the brain is connected to other neurons 
through structures called synapses.46 A biological neuron consists of 
dendrites—receivers of various electrical impulses from other neurons—
that are gathered in the cell body of a neuron.47 Once the neuron’s cell body 
has collected enough electrical energy to exceed a threshold amount, the 
neuron transmits an electrical charge to other neurons in the brain through 
synapses.48 This transfer of information in the biological brain provides the 
foundation on which modern neural networks are modeled and operate.49 
Every neural network has an input layer and an output layer.50 
However, in between the input and output layer, neural networks contain 
multiple hidden layers of connected neurons.51 In a neural network, the 
neurons are connected by weight coefficients modeling the strength of 
synapses in the biological brain.52 The depth of the network is in large part 
a description of the number of hidden layers.53 Deep Neural Networks start 
from raw input and then each hidden layer combines the values in its 
preceding layer and learns more complicated functions of the input.54 The 
mathematics of the network transferring information from input to output 
varies, but is generally matrix mathematics and vector calculus.55 During 
training, the model processes data from input to output, often described as 
the feedforward portion.56 The output of the model is typically a 
prediction.57 For example, whether an object is the correct target, or the 
wrong target would be calculated with a convolutional neural network 
 
 43.  Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 106-107. 
 44.  Michael Simon, et al., supra note 38, 254. 
 45.  Moheb Costandi, NEUROPLASTICITY 6 (2016). 
 46.  Id. at 9. 
 47.  Id. at 7. 
 48.  Raschka & Mirjalili, supra note 27, at 18.  
 49.  Haney, supra note 22 at 158. 
 50.  Kurzweil, supra note 9, at 132. 
 51.  Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 100. 
 52.  Id. at 88. 
 53.  Tegmark, supra note 18, at 76. 
 54.  Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 104. 
 55.  Manon Legrand, Deep Reinforcement Learning for Autonomous Vehicle Control 
Among Human Drivers, at 23 (academic year 2016–17) (unpublished C.S. thesis, Université 
Libre de Bruxelles), https://ai.vub.ac.be/sites/default/files/thesis_legrand.pdf. 
 56.  Eugene Charniak, INTRODUCTION TO DEEP LEARNING 10 (2018). 
 57.  Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 90 (2014). 
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(CNN).58 The function of the CNN is in essence a classification task, where 
the CNN classifies objects or areas based upon their similarity.59 CNNs are 
the main model used for deep learning in computer vision tasks.60 
However, the learning occurs during the backpropagation process.61 
Backpropagation describes the way which neural networks are trained to 
derive meaning from data.62 Generally, the mathematics of the 
backpropagation algorithm includes partial derivative calculations and a 
loss function to be minimized.63 The algorithm’s essential function adjusts 
the weights of a neural network to reduce error.64 The algorithm’s ultimate 
goal is the convergence of an optimal network, but probabilistic 
maximization also provides state-of-the-art performance in real world 
domains.65 Dynamic feedback allows derivative calculations supporting 
error minimization.66 One popular algorithm for backpropagation is 
stochastic gradient descent (SGD), iteratively updates the weights of the 
network according to a loss function.67 
After the training process the model is then tested on new data, and if 
successful, deployed for the purpose deriving knowledge from 
information.68 The process of deriving knowledge from information is 
commonly accomplished with feature extraction.69 Feature extraction is a 
method of dimensionality reduction allowing raw inputs to convert to an 
output revealing abstract relationships among data.70 Neural networks 
extract these abstract relationships by combining previous input 
information in higher dimensional space as the network iterates.71 In other 
words, deep neural networks learn more complicated functions of their 
initial input when each hidden layer combines the values of the preceding 
 
 58.  Daniel Maturana & Sebastian Scherer, 3D Convolutional Neural Networks for 
Landing Zone Detection from LiDar, 2 (2015), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/ 
7139679. 
 59.  Rashid, supra note 39, at 159. 
 60.  Legrand, supra note 55, at 23.  
 61.  Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 26, at 130. 
 62.  Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 100. 
 63.  Paul John Werbos, THE ROOTS OF BACKPROPAGATION FROM ORDERED DERIVATIVES 
TO NEURAL NETWORKS AND POLITICAL FORECASTING 269 (1994). 
 64.  Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 89. 
 65.  Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 26, at 131. 
 66.  Werbos, supra note 63, at 72.  
 67.  Steven M Bellovin, et al., Privacy and Synthetic Datasets, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
1, 29 (2019). 
 68.  Alpaydin, supra note 25, at 106-107. 
 69.  Id. at 89. 
 70.  Id. at 102. 
 71.  Kelleher & Tierney, supra note 26, at 135. 
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layer.72 In addition to deep learning, reinforcement learning is also a major 
cause of concern for purposes of national security policy. 
B. Reinforcement Learning 
At its core, reinforcement learning is an optimization algorithm.73 In 
short, reinforcement learning is a type of machine learning concerned with 
learning how an agent should behave in an environment to maximize a 
reward.74 Agents are the software programs making intelligent decisions.75 
Generally, reinforcement learning algorithms contain three elements: 
Model: the description of the agent-environment relationship; 
Policy: the way in which the agent makes decisions; and 
Reward: the agent’s goal.76 
The fundamental reinforcement learning model is the Markov 
Decision Process (MDP).77 The MDP model was developed by the Russian 
Mathematician Andrey Markov in 1913.78 Interestingly, Markov’s work 
over a century ago remains the state-of-the-art in AI today.79 The model 
below describes the agent-environment interaction in an MDP:80 
 
 
 72.  ALPAYDIN, supra note 25, at 104. 
 73.  Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control Through Deep Reinforcement 
Learning, 518 NATURE INT’L  J. SCI. 529, 529 (2015). 
 74.  ALPAYDIN, supra note 25, at 127. 
 75.  RICHARD S. SUTTON, ANDREW G. BARTO, REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: AN 
INTRODUCTION 3 (The MIT Press eds., 2nd ed. 2017). 
 76.  Katerina Fragkiadaki, Deep Q Learning, Carnegie Mellon Computer Science, 
CMU 10703 (Fall 2018), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~katef/DeepRLFall2018/lecture_DQL_k 
ate f2018.pdf. 
 77.  Haney, supra note 22 at 161. 
 78.  Gely P. Basharin, et al, The Life and Work of A.A. Markov, 386 Linear Algebra and 
its Applications, 4, 15 (2004).  
 79.  GEORGE GILDER, LIFE AFTER GOOGLE 75 (2018). 
 80.  SUTTON & BARTO, supra note 75, at 38. (model created by author based on 
illustration at the preceding citation). 
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The environment is made up of states for each point in time in which the 
environment exists.81 The learning begins when the agent takes an initial 
action selected from the first state in the environment.82 Once the agent 
selects an action, the environment returns a reward and the next state.83 
Generally, the goal for the agent is to interact with its environment 
according to an optimal policy.84 
The second element of the reinforcement learning framework is the 
policy. A policy is the way in which an agent makes decisions or chooses 
actions within a state.85 In other words, the agent chooses which action to 
take when presented with a state based upon the agent’s policy.86 For 
example, a greedy person has a policy that routinely guides their decision 
making toward acquiring the most wealth. The goal of the policy is to 
allow the agent to advance through the environment so as to maximize a 
reward.87 
The third element of the reinforcement learning framework is the 
reward. Ultimately, the purpose of reinforcement learning is to maximize 
an agent’s reward.88 However, the reward itself may is defined by the 
designer of the algorithm. For each action the agent takes in the 
environment, a reward is returned.89 There are various ways of defining 
reward, based upon the specific application.90 But generally, the reward is 
associated with the final goal of the agent.91 For example, in a trading 
algorithm, the reward is money.92 In sum, the goal of reinforcement 
learning is to learn good policies for sequential decision problems by 
optimizing a cumulative future reward.93 Interestingly, many thinkers 
throughout history have argued the human mind is itself a reinforcement 
learning system.94 Furthermore, reinforcement learning algorithms add 
 
 81.  ALPAYDIN, supra note 25, at 126-127. 
 82.  SUTTON, BARTO, supra note 75, at 2. 
 83.  MYKEL J. KOCHENDERFER, DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 77 (2015). 
 84.  Id. at 79. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  SUTTON & BARTO, supra note 75, at 39. 
 87.  WERBOS, supra note 63, at 311. 
 88.  SUTTON & BARTO, supra note 75, at 7. 
 89.  KOCHENDERFER, supra note 83, at 77. 
 90.  BOSTROM, supra note 11, at 239. 
 91.  MAXIM LAPAN, DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING HANDS-ON 3 (2018). 
 92.  Id. at 217. 
 93.  Hado van Hasselt, Arthur Guez, & David Silver, Deep Reinforcement Learning 
with Q-Learning, Google DeepMind, 2094 (2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.06461. 
 94.  WERBOS, supra note 63, at 307. 
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substantial improvements to deep learning models, especially when the two 
models are combined.95 
C. Deep Reinforcement Learning 
Deep Reinforcement Learning is an intelligence technique 
combining deep learning and reinforcement learning principles. Max 
Tegmark suggests that deep reinforcement learning was developed by 
Google in 2015.96 However, earlier scholarship explores and explains the 
integration of neural networks in the reinforcement learning paradigm.97 
Arguably, deep reinforcement learning is a method of general intelligence 
because of its theoretic capability to solve any continuous control task.98 
For example, deep reinforcement learning algorithms drive state-of-the-art 
autonomous vehicles.99 However, it shows poorer performance on other 
types of tasks like writing, because mastery of human language is—for 
now—not describable as a continuous control problem.100 Regardless of its 
scalable nature toward general intelligence, deep reinforcement learning is 
a powerful type of artificial intelligence.101 Generally, there are three 
different frameworks for deep reinforcement learning: action-value, policy 
gradient, and actor-critic.102 
An example of an action-value based framework for a deep 
reinforcement learning algorithm is the Deep Q-Network (DQN).103 The 
DQN algorithm is a type of model-free-learning.104 In model-free-learning, 
there isn’t a formal description of the agent-environment relationship.105 
Instead, the agent randomly explores the environment, gathering 
information about the environment’s states, actions, and rewards.106 The 
algorithm stores the information in memory, called experience.107 
 
 95.  ALPAYDIN, supra note 25, at 136. 
 96.  TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 85. 
 97.  WERBOS, supra note 63, at 307. 
 98.  TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 39. 
 99.  Alex Kendall, et al., Learning to Drive in A Day (2018), https://arxiv.org/ 
abs/1807.00412. 
 100.  NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 17 (1957). 
 101.  TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 39. 
 102.  Shixun You, et al., Deep Reinforcement Learning for Target Searching in 
Cognitive Electronic Warfare, IEEE Access Vol. 7, 37432, 37438 (2019). 
 103.  Mnih, et al., supra note 73, at 529.  
 104.  KOCHENDERFER, supra note 83, at 122. 
 105.  Id. at 121. 
 106.  LAPAN, supra note 91, at 127. 
 107.  CHARNIAK, supra note 56, at 133. 
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The DQN algorithm develops an optimal policy ∗ for an agent 
with a Q-learning algorithm.108 The optimal policy is the best method of 
decision making for an agent with the goal of maximizing reward.109 The 
Q-learning algorithm maximizes a Q-function: Q , , where  is the state 
of an environment and  is an action in the state.110 In essence, by applying 
the optimal Q-function ∗ to every state-action pair ,  in an 
environment, the agent is acting according to the optimal policy.111 
However, computing Q ,  for each state-action pair in the environment 
is computationally expensive.112 
Instead, the DQN algorithm approximates the value of each state 
state-action pair:113 
, ; , . 
Here,  represents the function parameters, which are the function’s 
variables.114 The parameters are determined by a neural network using 
experience replay.115 Experience replay refers to the agent’s experiences 
stored in memory, which are used to train the neural network to 
approximate the value of state-action pairs.116 The neural network iterates 
until the convergence of the Q-function as determined by the Bellman 
Equation:117 
∗ , ~ max
∗ , | , . 
Here, ~  refers to the expectation for all states,  is the reward,  is a 
discount factor typically defined  0 	 1, allowing present rewards to 
have higher value.118 Additionally, the  function describes an action at 
which the Q-function takes its maximal value for each state-action pair.119 
In other words, the Bellman Equation does two things; it defines the 
 
 108.  Mnih, et al., supra note 73, at 529. 
 109.  KOCHENDERFER, supra note 83, at 80-81. 
 110.  Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, Methods and Apparatus for Reinforcement 
Learning, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/097,862 at 5 (filed Dec. 5, 2013), https://patents. 
google.com/patent/US20150100530A1/en. 
 111.  LAPAN, supra note 91, at 144. 
 112.  Mnih & Kavukcuoglu, supra note 110, at 5. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  CHARNIAK, supra note 56, at 133. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Haney, supra note 22, at 162. 
 118.  KOCHENDERFER, supra note 83, at 78. 
 119.  Brian S. Haney, The Optimal Agent: The Future of Autonomous Vehicles & 
Liability Theory, 29 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3261275. 
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optimal Q-function and allows the agent to consider the reward from its 
present state as greater relative to similar rewards in future states.120 
Thus, the DQN algorithm combines Q-learning with a neural network to 
maximize reward.121 After the optimal policy is defined according to: 
∗ ∗ , , 
the agent engages in the exploitation of its environment.122 During the 
exploitation phase, the agent maximizes its reward by making decisions 
according to the optimal policy.123 The DQN is an off-policy algorithm, 
meaning it uses data to optimize performance.124 Indeed, DQN is 
essentially a reinforcement learning algorithm, where the agent uses a 
neural network to decide which actions to take. 
A second variant of deep reinforcement learning is the Proximal 
Policy Optimization (“PPO”) algorithm, a gradient technique.125 Similar to 
the DQN algorithm, the PPO algorithm is a method of model-free 
learning.126 In contrast to the DQN algorithm, PPO is an on-policy 
algorithm, meaning it does not learn from old data and instead directly 
optimize policy performance.127 One advantage of the PPO model is that it 
can be used for environments with either discrete or continuous action 
spaces.128 
In general, PPO works by computing an estimator of the policy 
gradient and iterating with a stochastic gradient optimization algorithm.129 
In other words, the algorithm continuously updates the agent’s policy based 
on the old policy’s performance.130 The PPO update algorithm may be 
defined:131 
argmax , ~ , , , . 
 
 120.  LAPAN, supra note 91, at 102-03. 
 121.  WERBOS, supra note 63, at 306-07. 
 122.  LAPAN, supra note 91, at 127. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Hado van Hasselt, Arthur Guez, and David Silver, Deep Reinforcement Learning 
with Q-Learning, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2098 (2016), https://www.a 
aai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI16/paper/download/12389/11847. 
 125.  John Schulman, et al., High-Dimensional Continuous Control Using Generalized 
Advantage Estimation, INT’L CONF. ON LEARNING REPRESENTATIONS (2016), https://ar 
xiv.org/abs/1506.02438. 
 126.  CHARNIAK, supra note 56, at 124. 
 127.  OpenAI, Proximal Policy Optimization, OpenAI Spinning UP (2018), https://spin 
ningup.openai.com/en/latest/algorithms/ppo.html. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  John Schulman, et al., Proximal Policy Optimization Algorithms, OpenAI at 2 
(2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.06347. 
 130.  KOCHENDERFER, supra note 83, at 80. 
 131.  Proximal Policy Optimization, supra note 127. 
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Here, , , , 	  is the objective function,  are the policy parameters, 
 are the policy parameters for  experiment.132 Generally, the PPO 
update is a method of incremental improvement for a policy’s expected 
return.133 Essentially, the algorithm takes multiple steps via SGD to 
maximize the objective.134 
The PPO algorithm’s key to the success is obtaining good 
estimates of an advantage function.135 The advantage function describes the 
advantage of a particular policy relative to another policy.136 For example, 
if the advantage for the state-action pair is positive, the objective reduces 
to:137 
, , ,
|
|
, 1 , . 
Here,  is the advantage estimate for the policy given parameters 
| , and the hyperparameter  corresponds to how far away the new 
policy can step from the old while still profiting the objective.138 Where the 
advantage is positive the objective increases and the  function puts a 
limit to how much the objective can increase.139 
The limitation on the objective increase is called clipping.140 The 
algorithm’s goal is to make the largest possible improvement on a policy, 
without stepping so far as to cause performance collapse.141 To achieve this 
goal, PPO relies on clipping the objective function to remove incentives for 
the new policy to step far from the old policy.142 In essence, the clipping 
serves as a regularizer, minimizing incentives for the policy to change 
dramatically.143 
A third variant of Deep Reinforcement Learning and an example of 
the actor-critic framework is the Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient 
(“DDPG”) algorithm.144 Like both DQN and PPO, DDPG is a model-free 
 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Schulman, et al., supra note 129, at 2.  
 134.  LAPAN, supra note 91, at 427. 
 135.  See Schulman, et al., supra note 125. 
 136.  See Proximal Policy Optimization, supra note 127. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  LAPAN, supra note 91, at 432. 
 139.  See Proximal Policy Optimization, supra note 127. 
 140.  Schulman, et al., supra note 129, at 3. 
 141.  Proximal Policy Optimization, supra note 127. 
 142.  Schulman, et al., supra note 129, at 3. 
 143.  Proximal Policy Optimization, supra note 127. 
144. LAPAN, supra note 91, at 410. 
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learning method.145 However, unlike PPO, DDPG is only applicable in 
continuous action spaces.146 In form DDPG is relatively similar to DQN.147 
DDPG is an off-policy algorithm, meaning it re-uses old data.148 In short, 
DDPG is a method of deep reinforcement learning using two function 
approximators, an actor and a critic.149 
The critic estimates the optimal action-value function ∗ .150 Generally, 
the action-value function is tailored to continuous action spaces, defined:  
∗ 	 	 max ∗ , . 
Here, the optimal action ∗  is defined as a value of ∗ ,  at which  
takes its optimal value according to the Bellman Equation.151 The critic’s 
role is to minimize loss, typically using a means squared error function, or 
target network, which gives consistent target values.152 The input of the 
target network is derived from a replay buffer, utilizing experience replay 
similar to the DQN algorithm.153 As the process occurs, the actor is 
iteratively updated accordingly.154 To learn the optimal policy the DDPG 
learns a deterministic policy  which gives the action maximizing 
, :155 
max ~ , . 
Here, the Q-function parameters  are constants and ~  is the state 
sampled from the replay buffer.156 
Ultimately, the actor decides which action to take.157 But, to 
optimize an agent’s reward, after each action, the critic tells the actor and 
 
145. Timothy P. Lillicrap, et al., Continuous Control with Deep Reinforcement Learning, 1 
(2016), https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.02971. 
146. OpenAI, Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient, OpenAI Spinning UP (2018), 
https://spinningup.openai.com/en/latest/algorithms/ddpg.html. 
 147.  Lillicrap et al., supra note 145, at 1. 
148. Aprit Agarwal, Katharina Muelling, Katerina Fragkiadaki, Model Learning for Look-
ahead Exploration in Continuous Control, Cornell University (Nov. 20, 2018), https:// 
arxiv.org/abs/1811.08086. 
 149.  Alex Kendall et al., Learning to Drive in A Day, Cornell University (Sept. 11, 
2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00412. 
 150.  OpenAI, supra note 146. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Lillicrap et al., supra note 145, at 2. 
 153.  Charniak, supra note 56, at 133. 
 154.  David Silver et al., Deterministic Policy Gradient Algorithms, Deem Mind 
Technologies (2014), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v32/silver14.pdf. 
 155.  OpenAI, Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient, supra note 146. 
 156.  OpenAI, Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient, supra note 146. 
 157.  CHARNIAK, supra note 56, at 130. 
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defines necessary adjustment for performance improvement.158 The DDPG 
algorithm shows promise in continuous control tasks, for robotics control 
systems.159 For example, DDPG has shown state-of-the-art success for 
driving cars.160 However, the off-policy nature of the algorithm makes it 
much slower because it takes more computational power to train compared 
to the PPO and other on-policy algorithms. As computational hardware 
develops, quantum computers provide a faster method of computing than 
classical methods.161 
In sum, deep learning, reinforcement learning, and deep 
reinforcement learning provide a framework for analyzing the state-of-the-
art in AI technology. While the mathematical models underlying these 
systems are not new, their capabilities have shown rapid improvement 
symbiotically with the massive amount of information humans began 
collecting at the dawn of the digital age.162 Most importantly, modern AI 
systems are capable of generalizing information to make predictions and 
achieve goals.163 As a result, these systems are transforming the 
foundations of the defense industry, national security, and global warfare. 
II. Security Threats 
United States National Defense Strategy prioritizes competition 
with China and Russia.164 Currently, among these three countries, there is 
an on-going arms race toward developing the most powerful AI systems.165 
Some hope this continued escalation can be avoided.166 However, the 
incentives associated with becoming the world leader in AI technology are 
great, while the harms of nations falling behind could surely be fatal.167 
Thus, the AI arms races will certainly continue. 
 
 158.  Aleksandra Faust et al., PRM-RL: Long-range Robotic Navigation Tasks by 
Combining Reinforcement Learning and Sampling-based Planning (2018) https://a 
rxiv.org/abs/1710.03937v2. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Alex Kendall et al., Learning to Drive in A Day (2018), https://arxiv. 
org/abs/1807.00412. 
 161.  Jacob Biamonte et al., Quantum Machine Learning at 2 (2018) https://arxiv.org/ 
abs/1611.09347. 
 162.  GILDER, supra note 79, at 75; see also SUSSKIND, supra note 31, at 11. 
 163.  TEGMARK, supra note 18, at 85-86. 
 164.  Mark D. Miles & Charles R. Miller, Global Risks and Opportunities the Great 
Power Competition Paradigm, JFQ 94 3rd Quarter, at 80 (2019). 
 165.  An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone, National Defense University Press, JFQ 92, 
1st Quarter, at 5 (2019). 
 166.  Baker, supra note 12, at 5.  
 167.  BOSTROM, supra note 11, at 96-97. 
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Northwestern Law Professor, John McGinnis, argues, “[t]he way to 
think about the effects of AI on war is to think of the consequences of 
substituting technologically advanced robots for humans on the 
battlefield.”168 However, this mode of thought completely fails to 
communicate AI security threats. Indeed, today the battlefield is 
everywhere, and the United States is bombarded with cyber-attacks every 
day.169 McGinnis further argues, “The existential dread of machines that 
become uncontrollable by humans and the political anxiety about 
machines’ destructive power on a revolutionized battlefield are 
overblown.”170 Yet, China has developed and made publicly available state-
of-the-art AI guided missile technology and computer programs.171 And, 
Russia routinely and intentionally manipulates United States voters on 
social media for the purposes of influencing political elections.172 In short, 
AI is the most important weapon in modern warfare, primarily in the 
defense, and national security sectors. The following sections will discuss 
AI applications of three types of security threats: missile attack, cyber-
attack, and general intelligence. 
A. Missiles 
Richmond School of Law Professor and Member of the Center for 
New American Security’s Task Force on Artificial Intelligence and 
National Security, Rebecca Crootof, suggests weapons may be grouped 
into three categories: inert, semi-autonomous, and autonomous.173 Inert 
weapons require human operation to be lethal, such as, stones, knives, or 
handheld firearms.174 Semi-autonomous weapon systems have autonomous 
capabilities in functions relevant to target selection and engagement, but 
the system cannot both select and engage targets independently.175  Third, 
autonomous weapon systems are capable of independently selecting and 
engaging targets based on conclusions derived from gathered information 
and preprogramed constraints.176 
 
 168.  John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1266 (2010). 
 169.  John P. Carlin, Detect, Disrupt, Deter: A Whole-of-Government Approach to 
National Security Cyber Threats, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 391, 398 (2016). 
 170.  McGinnis, supra note 168, at 1254. 
 171.  Shixun You, et al., supra note 102, at 37447. 
 172.  U.S. Department of Justice, Report on The Investigation into Russian Interference 
in the 2016 Presidential Election, Vol I at 4 (March 2019), https://www.just 
ice.gov/storage/report_volume1.pdf. 
 173.  Rebecca Crootof, Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Limits of Analogy, 9 
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 51, 59 (2018). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
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Professor Crootof argues, “autonomous weapon systems in use 
today act in largely predictable ways.”177 Similarly, The Honorable James 
E. Baker, argues that autonomous weapon systems are nothing new.178 
Judge Baker claims autonomous weapons have been standard military 
technology since the 1970s, and the United States reserves the technology 
for defensive purposes.179 Further, according to the Department of Defense, 
“[p]otential adversaries are also developing an increasingly diverse, 
expansive, and modern range of offensive missile systems that can threaten 
U.S. forces abroad.”180 However, these perspectives sincerely 
underestimate the capabilities modern missile systems, particularly in light 
of AI advancements.181 Inarguably, AI has changed the role of robotics 
control systems in warfare.182 
It is important to understand foreign adversaries have the ability to 
attack the United States homeland with AI controlled missile systems at 
such a scale to which the United States would be entirely unable to 
respond.183 Indeed, in a recent study funded by the National Natural 
Science Foundation of China, Deep Reinforcement Learning for Target 
Searching in Cognitive Electronic Warfare (China AI Missile Study), 
researchers demonstrate Chinese capabilities in deep reinforcement 
learning control systems for missile control.184 The United States funded 
similar research through the Naval Post-Graduate School in a 2017 report, 
A Framework Using Machine Vision and Deep Reinforcement Learning for 
Self-Learning Moving Objects in a Virtual Environment (Navy AI 
Study).185 However, the Chinese research is not only far more advanced, 
but also open-sourced.186 Indeed, China’s system is adaptable to any 
environment or target across the globe.187 And, the code for China’s deep 
reinforcement learning missile control systems is available on GitHub.188 
 
 177.  Id. at 60. 
 178.  Baker, supra note 12, at 3. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review, Executive Summary III (2009), 
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/Th 
e%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf. 
 181.  Shixun You, et al., supra note 102, at 37447. 
 182.  JOHN JORDAN, ROBOTS 133 (2016). 
 183.  Shixun You, et al., supra note 102, at 37447. 
 184.  Id. at 37434. 
 185.  Richard Wu, et al., supra note 37. 
 186.  Shixun You, et al., supra note 102, at 37435. 
 187.  Id. at 37441. 
 188.  youshixun, vCEW New model of cognitive electronic warfare with 
countermeasures, GitHub https://github.com/youshixun/vCEW (2019). 
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Further, Google’s TensorFlow, is also available open-source and designed 
specifically for manufacturing and scalability.189 
AI missile technology is comparatively simple relative to AI 
controlled vehicles or rocket boosters due to the general lack of obstacles in 
a missile’s environment. Indeed, there are at most three elements needed to 
control an AI missile. First, a means of perception, which is commonly 
achieved with Light Detection and Ranging Device (LiDAR) sensors.190 
LiDAR sensors simply work by sending light pulses from a transmitter and 
measuring return times with a receiver.191 The time it takes for a pulse to 
return measures distance according to , where  is travel time, 	is 
the speed of light, and  is the distance between the LIDAR sensor and the 
object.192 The receiver then generates a point cloud map of the environment 
for processing.193 
Second, the processing typically occurs with convolutional neural 
networks (CNNs), which show state-of-the-art performance in computer 
vision tasks.194 CNNs utilize convolutional mathematics to perform 
computer vision tasks like object detection and classification.195 Further, 
CNNs are well suited for three-dimensional point cloud environments and 
integration with reinforcement learning algorithms.196 One study, 
conducted by research firm OpenAI, demonstrated the effectiveness of 
CNNs in real-time obstacle detection when integrated with reinforcement 
learning systems.197 
The third element is a method of optimization for decision making, 
commonly reinforcement learning.198 For example, the China AI Missile 
Study explored the use of DQN, PPO, and DDPG for control in its 
 
 189.  TensorFlow 2.0 Alpha is Available, TensorFlow, (2019), https://www.ten 
sorflow.org/install.  
 190.  Jeff Hecht, Lidar for Self-Driving Cars, OPTICS & PHOTONICS NEWS (Jan. 1, 2018), 
https://www.osa-opn.org/home/articles/volume_29/january_2018/features/lidar_for_self-dri 
ving_cars/. 
 191.  Gaetan Pennecot et al., Devices and Methods for a Rotating LIDAR Platform with 
Shared Transmit/Receive Path, GOOGLE, INC., No: 13/971,606, (Aug. 20, 2013), https://pate 
nts.google.com/patent/US9285464B2/en. 
 192.  Matthew J. McGill, LIDAR Remote Sensing, NASA Technical Reports Server 
(NTRS) (2002). 
 193.  Maturana, Scherer, supra note 58, at 2. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Legrand, supra note 55, at 23. 
 196.  Mnih et al., supra note 73, at 530. 
 197.  Gregory Kahn, Uncertainty-Aware Reinforcement Learning for Collision 
Avoidance (2017). 
 198.  Shixun You et al., Completing Explorer Games with a Deep Reinforcement 
Learning Framework Based on Behavior Angle Navigation, 8 ELECTRONICS 1,17 (2019). 
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simulated, real-time physics engine.199 Additionally, the Navy AI Missile 
Study experimented with the DQN algorithm.200 In the context of missile 
control, the reinforcement learning agent is able to visualize its 
environment with LiDAR and a CNN and generalize to avoid obstacles, 
including defense missiles.201 This framework maximizes the probability of 
success in target searching, detection, and engagement regardless of motion 
dynamics.202 As such, AI missile systems guided by LiDAR sensor data 
and controlled with deep reinforcement learning algorithms have the 
capability to attack any target on Earth, or in the atmosphere, with pixel 
precision.203 Importantly, this information and the tools to build such a 
system are widely available on the internet.204 
In short, Professor Crootof and Judge Baker’s misunderstandings 
about the nature of autonomous weapons derive from their grouping of all 
autonomous weapons as having analogous abilities and posing analogous 
levels of threat.205 Indeed, modern AI missile systems, specifically, deep 
reinforcement learning systems do not act in the same predictable ways as 
the autonomous missile systems of the 1970s.206 In fact, they are much 
different than the autonomous weapons of the 1970s.207 Critically, deep 
reinforcement learning missiles today are able to generalize about their 
environment, adapting, and evolving with the battlefield.208 Specifically, 
Chinese AI missile technology “is enhanced by the powerful generalization 
ability of . . . deep convolutional neural network[s].”209 
Indeed, according to the 2019 Department of Defense Missile 
Review, China now has the ability to threaten the United States with about 
125 nuclear missiles.210 The Review explains while the United States relies 
 
 199.  Shixun You et al., supra note 102, at 37438.  
 200.  Richard Wu et al., supra note 37, at 233. 
 201.  Gregory Kahn et al., Uncertainty-Aware Reinforcement Learning for Collision 
Avoidance (2017). 
 202.  Serena Yeung et al., Every Moment Counts: Dense Detailed Labeling of Actions in 
Complex Videos, 126 INT’L J. OF COMPUTER VISION 375, 376-378 (2017). 
 203.  Shixun You et al., supra note 102, at 37438. 
 204.  See Richard Wu et al., supra note 37; see also youshixun, New model of cognitive 
electronic warfare with countermeasures, GITHUB (2019) https://github.com/youshixun/v 
CEW; Install TensorFlow 2, TENSORFLOW (2019) https://www.tensorflow.org/install; 
Shixun You et al., supra note 102, at 37434-37447. 
 205.  Crootof, supra note 173 at 59. 
 206.  Id. at 60. 
 207.  Baker, supra note 12, at 3; see also Shixun You, Completing Explorer Games with 
a Deep Reinforcement Learning Framework Based on Behavior Angle Navigation, 8 
ELECTRONICS 1,17 (2019).  
 208.  Richard Wu et al., supra note 37, at 231. 
 209.  Shixun You et al., supra note 102, at 37438. 
 210.  Office of the Secretary of Defense, supra note 180, at III. 
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on deterrence to protect against sophisticated actors like China, active U.S. 
missile defense efforts must outpace rogue offensive missile strikes.211 But, 
despite massive over-spending, the United States Military is falling 
behind.212 Further, due to the availability of AI missile system construction 
and control information across the internet, AI missile attacks are an 
immediate national security threat.213 This is especially true considering 
hostile relationships with Iran, North Korea, and Middle Eastern militant 
organizations.214 Intimately related to the applications of AI missiles in 
national security, the role of AI in cybersecurity attacks is also a cause for 
immediate concern. 
B. Cybersecurity 
Top U.S. national security officials believe that AI and machine 
learning will have transformative implications for cybersecurity and cyber 
war.215 For example, according to National Security Agency (NSA) 
Director Paul M. Naksone, “As we look at near-peer competitors, China 
and Russia clearly are at the top of the list because they have the capacity 
to operate across the full spectrum of cyberspace operations.”216 However, 
Naksone seems to be behind the times in terms of AI military applications 
in cyberspace. Indeed, in a 2019 interview with National Defense 
University, Naksone stated, “I think that the early instantiation of AI will 
be on the defensive side.”217 Further, recent cybersecurity data and research 
provide strong evidence AI is already fueling offensive state sponsored 
cyber-attacks. 
The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), a policy 
research organization, records reported significant cyber-attacks on 
governments, defense and high technology companies, or economic crimes 
 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Craig Whitlock & Bob Woodward, Pentagon buries evidence of $125 billion in 
bureaucratic waste,  WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
investigations/pentagon-buries-evidence-of-125-billion-in-bureaucratic-waste/2016/12/05/e 
0668c76-9af6-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html; see also NATO, Defence Expenditure 
of NATO Countries (2012-2019), NATO (June 25, 2019), https://www.nato.int/nato_ 
static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_PR2019-069-EN.pdf.  
 213.  See youshixun, New model of cognitive electronic warfare with countermeasures, 
GITHUB (2019), https://github.com/youshixun/vCEW; see also Install TensorFlow 2, 
TENSORFLOW (2019), https://www.tensorflow.org/install. 
 214.  Office of the Secretary of Defense, supra note 180, at III-IV. 
 215.  Greg Allen &Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, HARV. 
KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. AND INT’L AFF. 1, 18 (2017). 
 216.  An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone, National Defense University Press, JFQ 92, 
1st Quarter, at 5 (2019). 
 217.  Id. at 8. 
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in excess of a million dollars.218 The table below illustrates the number of 
Chinese and Russian cyber-attacks per year.219 
 
While the accelerating trend in cyber-attacks could be due to a number of 
factors, AI is unquestionably playing a contributing rule. Indeed, AI 
provides more powerful attack mechanisms which are widely available, 
making this trend likely to continue.220 
Military defense and political hacking are now commonplace.221 
Some of the most significant defense and political related attacks reported 
by the CSIS include:222 
1. May 2019. Hackers affiliated with the Chinese intelligence service 
reportedly had been using NSA hacking tools since 2016, more 
than a year before those tools were publicly leaked. 
2. March 2019. U.S. officials reported that at least 27 universities in 
the U.S. had been targeted by Chinese hackers as part of a 
campaign to steal research on naval technologies. 
 
 218.  Center for Strategic and International Studies, Significant Cyber Incidents (August 
2019), https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-incidents. 
 219.  See Appendix B. Significant Cyber Incidents for chart data (Chart prepared by 
author with information from, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Significant 
Cyber Incidents (August 2019), https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-progra 
m/significant-cyber-incidents. 
 220.  See Hyrum S. Anderson et al., Learning to Evade Static PE Machine Learning 
Malware Models via Reinforcement Learning, Cornell University Library (2018), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.08917; see also endgameinc, Malware Env for OpenAI Gym 
(2018), https://github.com/endgameinc/gym-malware. 
 221.  Significant Cyber Incidents, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD. (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-incidents. 
 222.  Id.  
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3. October 2018. Media reports state than U.S. agencies warned 
President Trump that that China and Russia eavesdropped on call 
made from an unsecured phone. 
4. August 2018. Microsoft announces that Russian hackers had 
targeted U.S. Senators and Center conservative think tanks critical 
of Russia. 
5. February 2016. Hackers breached the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
database, stealing and releasing the names, phone numbers, and 
email addresses or 30,000 DHS and FBI employees. 
6. October 2016. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence and 
Department of Homeland Security jointly identified Russia as 
responsible for hacking the Democratic National Committee and 
using WikiLeaks to dump emails obtained in the hack. 
7. April 2015. U.S. officials report that hackers gained access to 
White House networks and sensitive information, such as “real-
time non-public details of the president’s schedule,” through the 
State Department’s network, which has had continued trouble in 
ousting attackers. 
8. February 2012. Media reports say that Chinese hackers stole 
classified information about the technologies onboard F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighters.223 
The pervasive use of cyberspace for a variety of covert international 
operations provides support for the argument that an AI arms race is in full 
swing.224 Indeed, AI provides a decisive advantage in the penetration and 
security of networks.225 While it is difficult to know the specific 
architectures used, the wide-spread availability of AI cyber-attack research 
and code strongly suggests malicious AI software is already common-
place.226 
As the data reflects, cyber-dependent nations are vulnerable to 
political manipulation.227 Indeed, politically motivated cyber-attacks are far 
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 224.  Ido Kilovaty, Doxfare: Politically Motivated Leaks and the Future of the Norm on 
Non-Intervention in the Era of Weaponized Information, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 146, 150 
(2018). 
 225.  Alberto Perez Veiga, Applications of Artificial Intelligence to Network Security, 14 
(2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09992. 
 226.  Miles Brundage et al., The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, 
Prevention, and Mitigation, 34 (Cornell University Library 2018) https://arxiv.org/pdf/ 
1802.07228.pdf; see also Anderson et al., supra note 220.  
 227.  Kilovaty, supra note 224, at 150.  
4 - HANEY_HSTLJ11-1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/4/2019  10:01 AM 
Winter 2020] APPLIED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 83 
from a new phenomenon.228 And, Russia has significantly expanded its 
budget in these areas over the last few years to sway public opinion around 
the world.229 One direct example, includes the Internet Research Agency 
(IRA), a Russian intelligence company, and The Main Intelligence 
Directorate of the Russian Army’s (GRU) hacking operations during the 
2016 Presidential Election.230 According to the Mueller Report, the IRA 
and GRU both engaged in hacking Democratic National Committee 
networks for the purpose of influencing the election’s outcome.231 Further, 
the Mueller Report details the IRA’s social media tactics with the intent of 
swaying voters.232 Another example refers to the Cambridge Analytica 
Scandal, where 87 million Facebook users had their personal data exposed 
without their consent and used by Cambridge Analytica to support political 
campaigns.233 As a result, data driven AI cyber-tools for manipulating 
voters via social media are critical to the integrity of United States elections 
and thus, National Security.234 
Unsurprisingly, AI research in cybersecurity is rapidly expanding. 
For example, one piece of scholarship specifically details guidelines for the 
development of malicious AI software.235 The scholarship demonstrates the 
practical possibilities of developing malicious machine learning algorithms 
capable of harming humans.236 Another paper, Adversarial Reinforcement 
Learning in a Cyber Security Simulation, introduces a game played 
between adversarial reinforcement learning systems: an attacker and a 
defender.237 The paper illustrates a cyber security simulation with two 
Markov agents playing against each other as attacker and defender of a 
cyber network.238 Drawing on this work, a third paper was introduced in 
2019, Deep Reinforcement Learning for Cyber Security, which developed a 
similar simulation exploring the effectiveness of action-value, policy, and 
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actor-critic deep reinforcement learning models for network attack and 
defense.239 
Interestingly, one paper, Learning to Evade Static PE Machine 
Learning Malware Models via Reinforcement Learning, gives specific 
details regarding reinforcement learning malware models and provided an 
open-source code on GitHub.240 The reinforcement learning model in the 
paper is an evasive malware variant, which can be effective on samples not 
used during training.241 Samples are prime examples of malware detection 
software for processing and classifying data.242 The purpose of training is 
to allow the reinforcement learning agent to generalize new experiences; in 
other words, bypass new malware detection software.243 The algorithm uses 
Q-learning and an MDP framework to train a reinforcement learning agent, 
where the reward function is associated with an anti-malware detection 
system (or an anti-malware engine).244 If the anti-malware system detects 
the agent, its reward is zero, otherwise its reward is ten.245 The researchers 
used OpenAI Gym, a software tool for building reinforcement learning 
environments, to conduct their experiments.246 Consequently, the key 
takeaway of the paper is that the attacker requires no prior knowledge 
about the target to successfully penetrate a system under attack.247 
Cyberspace allows humanity to communicate, trade, research, and 
share information on a global scale.248 Yet, cyber-attacks are surging and 
increasing in volume each year.249  As a result, data breaches have 
escalated increasing criticisms from regulators, private plaintiffs, and 
public opinion.250 On the global scale, data and information are only as 
secure as the algorithms and network structures by which they are 
protected. Arguably, nothing that happens on a computer is secure, let 
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alone private.251 Thus, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding 
security at all levels.252 Indeed, the weaponization of cyberspace and 
resulting cyberwarfare, are creating a world in which traditional security 
defense models are futile.253 And, the capability of hacking an enemy car, 
plane, nuclear reactor, communication system, or financial system has the 
potential to cripple an opposition’s economy and defense capability.254 
From a national security perspective, the United States is no longer 
the world leader in cybersecurity.255 Indeed, The United States is under 
constant attack online.256 Adversaries have caught up and arguably 
surpassed domestic cyber capabilities.257 Many nations continue investing 
heavily in AI research and its commercial capabilities, exploiting new 
advances.258 At the same time, the United States has been ignoring AI over 
the last decade.259 As a result, the United States is consistently attacked on 
its vulnerable cyber-front and is subject to imminent national security 
threats.260 While the United States faces imminent cybersecurity threats 
stemming from AI, the development of Artificial General Intelligence 
poses threats to both national and global security. 
C. Artificial General Intelligence 
AI’s holy grail, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), is a system capable 
of achieving any goal.261 Current methods of AGI development are 
commonly referred to as whole-brain emulation, where the idea is to 
reverse engineer the human brain with computation.262 Yet, the Wright 
brothers’ first flight was not aboard a mechanical bird with flapping 
wings.263 In fact, prominent physicist Michio Kaku argues computers 
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cannot truly replicate the behavior of human brains.264 Kaku argues the 
shortcomings of modern neural networks persuasively, focusing on their 
inability to account from neurochemical fluctuations in information 
transfer.265 
However, the legendary machine learning developer Paul John 
Werbos argued, from an engineering point of view, the human brain is an 
information processing system.266 Therefore, it may be more likely AGI 
will result from a more simplified neural processing model capable of 
recursive self-improvement.267 For example, famed philosopher of mind, 
Zoltan Torey approaches the mind from a linguistic perspective.268 Indeed, 
according to Torey, the mind is made up of perceptions and words 
corresponding to those perceptions.269 
Yet, some argue that AGI may never happen.270 For example, the 
late Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen argues that scientific progress is 
irregular and hypothesizes that at the end the twenty-first century humans 
will have yet to achieve AGI.271 Indeed, current systems are far from 
achieving many goals, particularly time-consuming tasks.272 One example 
of such a task would be for a system to litigate a complex case in court 
from the filing of the complaint, through discovery, all the way to trial and 
verdict.273 
To date, the closest mankind has come toward developing an AGI 
was Volodymyr Mnih’s seminal paper, Human-Level Control Through 
Deep Reinforcement Learning, where Mnih introduces the DQN algorithm 
and associated software code for playing Atari Games.274 Max Tegmark 
remarked of Minh’s paper, “deep reinforcement learning is a completely 
general technique.”275 In this sense, Mnih’s algorithm, the DQN, 
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generalizes about its environment to achieve its goal.276 But the DQN is 
limited by its environment, static reward structure, and training. Thus, a 
challenge exists to improve the generalizable qualities of current state-of-
the-art AI systems. 
From a national security perspective AGI is the end-all-be-all in 
advanced weaponry.277 Any state or corporation capable of controlling AGI 
would surely be capable of conquering the world.278 Indeed, with control of 
a system capable of achieving any goal controlling enemy defense systems, 
manipulating public opinion, and controlling information networks would 
be relatively simple.279 However, there exists a question as to whether a 
human creator could control an AGI.280 According to Max Tegmark, “we 
have no idea what will happen if humanity succeeds in building human-
level AGI.”281 Thus, we cannot take for granted that the outcome will be 
positive if AGI is created.282 
III. Policy 
New generations of advanced technologies are changing the power 
dynamics of our global society.283 Yet, legal scholarship on the topic of AI 
policy has denied and relatively ignored the national security threats 
associated with AI’s weaponization.284 For example, University of 
Washington Law Professor, Ryan Calo encourages regulators not to be 
distracted by claims of an “AI Apocalypse” and to focus their efforts on 
“more immediate harms.”285 However, it is important to realize, AI’s most 
immediate applications will be in warfare. 
Generally, it is accepted that law never keeps up with 
technology.286 However, the kinetics of the two systems are relative, and it 
is more of an apples to oranges comparison. What is more likely to be true 
is that United States policy makers and military leaders are ill-equipped to 
put policies in place to maintain military superiority. For example, Judge 
Baker explains, “I do not feel a sense of urgency to address the legal, 
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ethical, and policy challenges ahead.”287 Another example includes South 
Carolina Senator Lindsay Graham’s infamous question to Mark 
Zuckerberg, “Is Twitter the same as what you do?” during the Senate 
Judiciary & Commerce Committees Joint Hearing on Facebook Data 
Use.288 As Elon Musk persuasively argues, what governments need right 
now is not oversight, but rather insight, because right now the Government 
does not even have insight into AI issues.289 Specifically, Musk contends 
we need technically capable people in government positions who can 
monitor AI’s progress and steer it if warranted.290 This Part explores the 
policies and developments from the three countries leading the way in AI 
militarization: Russia, China, and the United States.  In analyzing the 
United States, this Part makes specific recommendations to improve 
current national security efforts. 
Professor Crootof argues in any armed conflict, the right of the 
parties in the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not 
unlimited.291 Furthermore, both customary international law and various 
treaties circumscribe which weapons may be lawfully fielded.292 However, 
this line of argument does not apply in the context of AI. In fact, 
international laws and treaties are not laws in the sense that they are not 
enforceable because the nature of law rests on the assumption certain 
conduct be binding.293 As Hart argued, “If the rules of international law are 
not binding it is surely indefensible to take seriously their classification as 
law.”294 The Latin maxim Auctoritas non veritas facit legem; which stands 
for the principle, authority, not truth, makes law, provides insight into the 
fickle nature of international law.295 Or, in the words the English poet John 
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Lyly, “All is fair in love and war.”296 Therefore, any notion of an 
international AI treaty would be moot. In addition to the United States, 
China and Russia are making significant investments in AI for military 
purposes.297 
A. China 
In July 2017 China’s State Council released an AI plan and 
strategy calling for China to pass the United States by 2020 and become the 
world’s leader in AI by 2030, committing $150 billion to the goal.298 By 
the end of 2018, Chinese leadership assessed the program’s development as 
surpassing the United States, achieving its objective earlier than 
expected.299 A key advantage of China’s recent strategy has been in the 
development of innovative new systems, in direct contrast to the United 
States, whose commitments remain to updating outdated technologies and 
political favors toward the military industrial complex.300 
Indeed, as a direct result of China’s recent investments, China’s 
military and intelligence services possess the sophistication and resources 
to hack network systems, establish footholds behind perimeter defenses, 
exfiltrate valuable information, and sabotage critical network functions.301 
In fact, Chinese government organizations routinely translate, disseminate, 
and analyze U.S. government and think tank reports about AI.302 Further, in 
2017, China expressed a desire to utilize AI for flight guidance and target 
recognition systems in its new generations of cruise missiles.303 Just two 
years later, that desire was realized, and China is the world’s leader in 
missile technology with its development of deep reinforcement learning 
control systems for targeting and guidance.304 Further, Chinese 
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intercontinental ballistic missile and cruise missile systems reflect the state-
of-the-art.305 
Chinese commercial markets for autonomous drones and AI 
surveillance technologies have seen significant growth and success.306 
Additionally, Chinese weapons manufacturers are already selling armed AI 
controlled drones.307 Chinese AI market success directly increases its 
military and intelligence abilities because Chinese companies developing 
AI work in close cooperation with the Chinese Military.308 Some argue that 
many Chinese AI achievements are actually achievements of multinational 
research teams and companies.309 For example, regarding SpaceX’s 
decision not to patent its rocket technologies, Founder & CEO Elon Musk 
stated, “our primary long-term competition is in China—if we published 
patents, it would be farcical, because the Chinese would just use them as a 
recipe book.”310 Notably, none of the most popular machine learning 
software frameworks have been developed in China.311 However, China’s 
behavior of aggressively developing, utilizing, and exporting increasingly 
autonomous robotic weapons and surveillance AI technology runs counter 
to China’s stated goals of avoiding an AI arms race.312 
B. Russia 
Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s commitment to AI 
technologies stating, “[W]hoever becomes the leader in this field will rule 
the world.”313 Further, Russia continues to display a steady commitment to 
developing and deploying a wide range of AI military weapons.314 In fact, 
Russia is significantly expanding its budget in AI cybersecurity to sway 
public and political opinion around the world.315 For example, the IRA and 
GRU continue their hacking operations relating to United States 
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elections.316 These efforts largely reflect effective and extensive use of AI 
driven cybersecurity technologies.317 
Indeed, Russia stands out as a renewed threat in cyberspace.318 
Russia has demonstrated consistent and effective capabilities in 
implementing AI for behavior influencing.319 Prior to the 2016 presidential 
election, the IRA utilized Facebook and YouTube, targeting millions of 
users with advertisements aimed at influencing the election’s outcome.320 
Further, in October 2017, news broke of a Russian spy campaign targeted 
at key United States officials beginning in 2015 and lasting until the 
intrusion was discovered by the United States in September 2017.321 
In addition, Russia is establishing a number of organizations 
devoted to the development of military AI applications.322 Indeed, the 
Russian military has been researching and developing AI robotics control 
systems, with an emphasis on autonomous vehicles and planes with 
autonomous target identification and engagement capabilities.323And, in 
March 2018, Russia released plans for a National Center for Artificial 
Intelligence, among other defense related initiatives.324 Despite Russia’s 
aspirations, some analysts argue that it may be difficult for Russia to make 
significant progress in AI development due to lack of funding.325 However, 
others argue despite trailing behind the United States and China in military 
funding, Russia has still managed to become a powerful force in 
cyberspace.326 For example, in 2013 Russia was confident enough to grant 
the infamous Edward Snowden political asylum against pressure from the 
United States.327 
C. United States 
On February 11, 2019, President Trump issued an executive order 
aimed at establishing America’s place as the global leader in artificial 
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intelligence technology.328 The Executive Order on Maintaining American 
Leadership in Artificial Intelligence (Executive Order), explains the United 
States’ policy to enhance scientific, technological, and economic leadership 
in AI research and development guided by five principles:329 
1. The United States must drive technological breakthroughs in AI 
across the Federal Government, industry, and academia in order to 
promote scientific discovery, economic competitiveness, and 
national security. 
2. The United States must drive development of appropriate technical 
standards and reduce barriers to the safe testing and deployment of 
AI technologies in order to enable the creation of new AI-related 
industries and the adoption of AI by today’s industries. 
3. The United States must train current and future generations of 
American workers with the skills to develop and apply AI 
technologies to prepare them for today’s economy and jobs of the 
future. 
4. The United States must foster public trust and confidence in AI 
technologies and protect civil liberties, privacy, and American 
values in their application in order to fully realize the potential of 
AI technologies for the American people. 
5. The United States must promote an international environment that 
supports American AI research and innovation and opens markets 
for American AI industries, while protecting our technological 
advantage in AI and protecting our critical AI technologies from 
acquisition by strategic competitors and adversarial nations.330 
While, the Executive Order is a nice gesture in supporting development in 
the right direction, a clear course of action is lacking.331 The United States 
Government has a limited rule in scientific progress and development. 
Specifically, the only real role played in the development of technology 
comes from the power of the purse.332 And, the Executive Order does not 
provide for new research funds.333 
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Some AI & Law scholars argue AI should be regulated by a 
Government agency.334 For example, Matthew Scherer argues that the 
starting point for regulating AI should be a statute that establishes the 
general principles of AI regulation.335 Scherer proposes the Artificial 
Intelligence Development Act (“AIDA”), which would create an agency 
tasked with certifying the safety of AI systems.336 The main idea is that 
AIDA would delegate the substantive task of assessing the safety of AI 
systems to an independent agency staffed by specialists, thus insulating 
decisions about the safety of specific AI systems from the pressures exerted 
by electoral politics.337 But, it is unlikely that standard command and 
control models of regulation would be effective to regulate AI.338 
Further, Government agencies are notorious for over-spending and 
political corruption, specifically in defense procurement and regulation.339 
Indeed, in the words of the late John McCain, “Our broken defense 
acquisition system is a clear and present danger to the national security of 
the United States.”340 Despite calls for change, the military industrial 
complex is far too politically powerful to allow the system to improve.341 
Indeed, despite outspending Russia and China combined on defense, the 
United States is still falling behind.342 The reason is largely attributable to 
billions in administrative waste and a lack of agency accountability.343 In 
fact, one report suggests the Chinese are confident the United States will 
fail to innovate, continuing to overspend maintaining and upgrading 
outdated systems.344 Others argue, no matter the potential for AI, the 
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Government should handle development carefully.345 But the United States 
Government may have a more limited role in AI development than many 
suspect. 
Private companies are driving progress in AI. For example, Google 
has a massive intelligence portfolio.346 Some argue, Google’s AI 
technologies are scalable to an AGI model.347 Commercial AI products are 
already heavily deployed in marketing. Indeed, to take advantage of the 
services offered by today’s major online corporation such as Google, 
Facebook, and Twitter, consumers are forced to give away a great deal of 
personal information.348 A person’s browser history and buying habits, 
together with their personal information, are enough for machine learning 
algorithms to predict what they’ll buy and how much they’ll pay for it.349 
Interestingly, Judge Baker argues, national security law serves 
three purposes, providing essential values, process, and the substantive 
authority to act, as well as the left and right boundaries of action.350 
However, law is characterized by the relationship between a sovereign and 
subject acting in a habit of obedience.351  Whether, technology companies 
like Facebook, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Apple have more 
sovereignty than the United States an interesting debate. Further, most AI 
research advances are occurring in the private sector, where talent and 
funding exceeds the United States Government.352 As a result, militaries 
and intelligence agencies depend on the private sector for essential goods 
and services.353 Thus, some suggest the challenges of regulating fast-
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2018/083667 World Intellectual Property Organization Reinforcement Learning systems, to 
Silver, et al. DeepMind (2016). WO 2018071392, World Intellectual Property Organization, 
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Razvan, et al., DeepMind (2016). WO 2018/081089, World Intellectual Property 
Organization, Processing sequences using neural networks, to Van Den Oord, et al., 
DeepMind (2016). 
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moving technology are so great that industry self-regulatory approaches are 
often presented as the most effective mechanism to manage risk.354 
Therefore, one argument is the United States’ national security law is in the 
hands of private companies, rather than the Government. 
Some argue the United States’ technological superiority is 
increasingly being challenged by competitors.355 In truth, the United States 
government’s technological superiority has already been surpassed, if not 
by China, certainly by the private sector.356 Indeed, a serious question 
exists as to whether the AI arms race is between governments or private 
firms. Matthew Scherer argues Microsoft Google, Facebook, Amazon, and 
Baidu are in a private AI arms race.357 An indication of this arms race is 
Microsoft’s investment, OpenAI, whose stated mission is “to ensure that 
artificial general intelligence (AGI)—by which we mean highly 
autonomous systems that outperform humans at most economically 
valuable work—benefits all of humanity.”358 This mission was only slightly 
believable until the company received $1 billion in funding from 
Microsoft.359 Google’s AI principles include a mission to create an AI that 
is socially beneficial.360 Yet, despite being a world leader in AI, Google’s 
AI is used mainly for advertising, where Google derives ninety-five percent 
of its revenue.361 
There is little social benefit or societal good to come from AI. 
There are some benefits in fields like law and medicine, but AI innovation 
fails to solve the access problems foundational to these industries.362 At a 
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deeper level, inequality and injustice are largely supported by societal 
structures, staying blind to technological developments and AI will only 
exacerbate these problems. Indeed, AI is developing in corporations whose 
principle purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth.363 Further, the AI & 
Ethics school of thought is largely idealistic and academic.364 In a perfect 
world, corporate ethics would support AI development in compliance with 
certain principles.365 In reality, the United States Government has little 
control over profit driven big technology corporations and lacks 
meaningful insight into AI research.366 The Russian and Chinese 
Government also lack control over big technology corporations, relying on 
their research to develop their own AI systems. 367 In sum, the dynamics of 
United States AI national security policy largely revolve around decisions 
made by corporate actors, specifically: Amazon, Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft, and Apple.368 There is an improbable exception that a 
breakthrough in AI will occur by a smaller team or single person producing 
AGI.369 
Conclusion 
Conventional wisdom teaches technological progress is driven by 
the Law of Accelerating Returns (LOAR).370 The LOAR’s application to 
information technology, Moore’s Law, projects exponential trends in 
technological progress converging to an ultimate technological 
singularity.371 This notion has developed into a school of thought called 
Technological Utopianism.372 Technological Utopianism refers to the idea 
that digital life is the natural and desirable next step in the cosmic evolution 
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of humanity, which will be good.373 As a result of Technological 
Utopianism, a majority of literature on the subject of technology is 
inherently optimistic, both in terms of outcomes and rates of progress.374 
Yet, it is critical to resist the temptation to accept the claims of this 
literature.375 The future does not happen on its own and AI technologies 
could certainly have terrible outcomes.376 
One argument for the future of the United States Government in AI 
development is to pursue an open government model. Open government is 
a concept referring to the free flow of information between the Government 
and the public.377 The goal of such a model would be to improve 
transparency, education and access to critical AI information.378 As a result, 
AI issues could be discussed, debated, and decided democratically. 
However, in practice there is little hope such a model would be put into 
practice. This is particularly true in the United States where agencies fight 
tooth and nail to hide information to which the public has a right via FOIA 
litigation.379 
A second argument is that AI technology’s likely dissemination 
into the wrong hands resolves the Fermi Paradox. A paradox is a set of 
arguments with apparently true propositions, leading to a false 
conclusion.380 Consider, the Milky Way is one of hundreds of billions of 
galaxies in the Universe, each containing hundreds of billions of stars.381 
Commonly, these stars contain Earth-like planets.382 As a result, 
statistically it is almost certain life would have developed somewhere else 
in the Universe before life on Earth.383 And yet, mankind finds itself bound 
to a pale blue dot on the outskirts of the Milky Way, apparently alone in the 
Universe. Fermi’s Paradox asks the question, “Where are they?”384 
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The great British Mathematician Irving J. Good argued AGI would 
be the “last invention that man need ever make.”385 And the late Stephen 
Hawking observed, “The development of artificial intelligence could spell 
the end of the human race.”386 Further, both Nick Bostrom and Max 
Tegmark have argued persuasively, humans may not be able to control 
AGI.387 These observations provide support that AI may lead to a 
catastrophic event resolving the Fermi Paradox. 
In sum, the United States’ national security is now dependent, not 
on its Military or Defense Agencies, but on big technology companies. In 
part because big technology companies have powerful influence over 
political decision makers.388 Further, big technology companies have the 
most talented people and own the rights to the most powerful weapons. 
Yet, the answer is not to break up big technology companies, which 
disadvantages the United States compared to our adversaries.389 Instead the 
answer is to accept the changing power dynamics and do the best we can 
with a broken political system. The only alternative would be revolution.390 
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF NOTATION 
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APPENDIX B. SIGNIFICANT CYBER INCIDENTS DATA 
 
Year China Russia 
2009 
(September 2008 - August 2009) 
 
 
3 2 
2010 
(September 2009 - August 2010) 
 
 
9 3 
2011 
(September 2010 - August 2011) 
 
 
4 0 
2012 
(September 2011 - August 2012) 
 
 
4 0 
2013 
(September 2012 - August 2013) 
 
 
8 4 
2014 
(September 2013 - August 2014) 
 
 
3 0 
2015 
(September 2014 - August 2015) 
 
 
7 5 
2016 
(September 2015 - August 2016) 
 
 
3 5 
2017 
(September 2016 - August 2017) 
 
 
4 11 
2018 
(September 2017 - August 2018) 
 
 
13 27 
2019 
(September 2018 - August 2019) 
 
 
24 30 
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